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INSURRECTION AT QALA-I JANGI
Dodge Billingsley
B
y mid November 2001 there were only a few 
pockets of Taliban across northern 
Afghanistan. The last major city still in 
Taliban hands was Konduz in the northeast part of 
the country. In typical Afghan style, the surrender of 
Konduz to the Northern Alliance was negotiated 
while Northern Alliance forces tightened the circle 
around the besieged city. Within the ranks of the 
Taliban holding the city were a number of foreign 
fighters, the majority were said to be Pakistani and 
various Arab nationals. However, there were also 
supposed to be Chechens, Uzbeks, Uighurs and 
other foreign nationals within the ranks.
Any surrender of the city would have to take into 
account these foreigners, which was problematic 
since, not being local, they could not simply lay 
down their weapons and return to a life in 
Afghanistan outside war, or jump over to the side of 
the Northern Alliance. The Northern Alliance’s new 
ally, the U.S., was in Afghanistan hunting al Qaeda 
and was extremely interested in foreigners and any 
possible links to terrorists networks operating 
abroad—these foreigners had to be accounted for. In 
this political climate Taliban leaders negotiated for 
the surrender of the foreigners in their ranks in 
addition to Konduz itself.
It was finally negotiated that one such Taliban 
group, numbering as many as 500, would surrender 
to the warlord of Mazar-e Sharif, ethnic Uzbek 
General Rashid Dostum. Actually, Dostum was 
quite active in the negotiations for Konduz as it 
appears that he wanted to flex his muscle in the 
north and perhaps take part in the “land-grab” that 
was going on amongst Northern Alliance rivals in 
Afghanistan following the retreat or elimination of 
Taliban forces.
Saturday, 23 November
Saturday afternoon the foreign Taliban arrived 
northeast of Mazar-e Sharif. They arrived earlier 
than expected, but this could have been due to the 
fact that they had not traveled to the pre-designated
meeting place, but in fact stopped many miles short. 
There were a few hours of negotiations and then it 
seemed that the matter was resolved. They were told 
to throw their weapons in a truck and were 
considered disarmed. However, there were 
immediate signs of trouble in the desert meeting 
place as one Talib detonated a grenade killing 
himself and two other Taliban, wounding a Northern 
Alliance commander and an ITN reporter covering 
the surrender.
According to Amir Jan, a Taliban defector who 
actually helped negotiate the surrender of the foreign 
troops destined for Qala Jangi, there were a couple 
of critical mistakes made in the surrender process 
leading up to the meeting in the desert. First, he 
claims that the foreigners were to have surrendered 
in Erganak, 12 miles west of Mazar-e Sharif. 
Instead, they traveled to a point northeast of the 
strategic city causing confusion as to whether or not 
this was in fact the group surrendering. It was 
evident that another mistake occurred during the 
surrender negotiations, this time by Mullah Fahzel, 
the overall Taliban commander at Konduz. He 
instructed the foreigners to turn in their weapons but 
did not tell them that they would also be taken into 
custody. It appears that many, if not all, of the 
foreign Taliban believed they would turn in their 
weapons and then go free.
After some confusion, the matter was resolved, 
and, under the watchful eye of U.S. Special Forces, 
General Dostum ordered the prisoners loaded on 
trucks and transported to Qala-i Jangi, a nineteenth- 
century fortress located southwest of Mazar-e Sharif. 
General Dostum did not accompany the prisoners to 
Qala-i Jangi but instead continued on to Konduz to 
participate in the securing of that city from Taliban 
control. (There are many numbers floating around 
as to the size of the foreign Taliban escorted to Qala- 
i Jangi. By some accounts it seems there were no 
more than five trucks, which means that the number 
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Northern Alliance troops loyal to General Rashid Dostum in a mud hut atop the northeast tower on Monday morning, awaiting orders.
assuming 50 to a truck. However, by most accounts 
the number of 500 Taliban stands firm.)
The situation did not get better once the Taliban 
reached the fortress, roughly an hour’s drive from 
their meeting place in the desert. Again a Talib 
produced a grenade from an undisclosed place and 
detonated it, killing himself and killing or wounding 
another Northern Alliance officer, Nadir Ali. 
Sometime later another Talib detonated a grenade 
killing himself and a senior Hazara commander, 
Saeed Asad. By now darkness was upon the fortress 
and Dostum’s guards responded by herding the 
remaining prisoners into an underground cell 
complex beneath the “pink house”—a building in 
the center of the fortress’s southern 
courtyard—where they were left overnight.
Sunday, 24 November
That morning a CIA operative known only as 
Dave and fellow agent Johnny (Mike) Spann arrived 
at Qala-i Jangi to begin interrogating the prisoners. 
They arrived in separate vehicles which they parked 
in the north half of the fortress near an entrance to 
the southern courtyard. The prisoners were led from 
the cell structure into the southern courtyard one by 
one. According to American Taliban John Walker 
his hands were tied as he surfaced from the cells 
below. It is notable that there still had not been a 
thorough search of the Taliban prisoners.
For the CIA and the intelligence effort of the 
war, the prisoners were the first big capture of 
foreigners taken in the seven week war and it was
likely Spann and Dave were anxious to find out who 
was in the group. Dostum’s chief of intelligence, 
Sayid Kamil accompanied the CIA men into the 
southern courtyard and watched as they began 
talking to the prisoners.
At some point during the interrogations, the 
Taliban revolted and killed CIA officer Spann, 
wounded Dostum’s Intelligence Chief and killed a 
number of Northern Alliance guards as they took 
possession of the southern courtyard. The other CIA 
operative, Dave, managed to get out of the southern 
courtyard and run to a main building along the north 
wall. Also inside the main building were the Red 
Cross, who arrived to make sure the prisoners were 
being treated fairly, and at least one TV crew, 
including German ARD TV.
An intense firefight ensued between the Taliban 
inside the southern courtyard and the Northern 
Alliance troops guarding the prisoners. By all 
estimates, it appears that there were only about 100 
Northern Alliance soldiers in the fortress when the 
uprising occurred. During the struggle, Taliban 
insurgents set about freeing their comrades still 
under restraint and found a large cache of weapons 
and ammunition stored along the south side of the 
wall dividing the northern and southern courtyards.
Armed with mortars, RPGs and small arms, they 
took control of the southern courtyard and continued 
a brisk exchange of fire with Northern Alliance 
troops gathering along the north wall and roof of the 
main building. Two Northern Alliance T-55 main 
battle tanks assumed positions along the fortress’s
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north wall and courtyard below, and began firing 
100mm shells into the Taliban-held southern section.
Whether or not it was lost in the melee or just 
left in their vehicles, Dave was missing his 
communications gear when he reached the main 
building and was forced to use the German TV’s 
satellite telephone to call for help. Around two 
o’clock U.S. and British Special Forces personnel 
arrived at the fortress. After conferencing briefly 
with Northern Alliance commanders, and Dave still 
holed up in the main building, they assumed 
positions on the northwest towers and the roof of the 
main building and began orchestrating combat air 
support.
At around 4:00 p.m., the Special Forces teams 
guided the first of several air strikes on the fortress, 
while Dave, wounded Northern Alliance troops, and 
the journalists, climbed over the back wall from their 
position along the inner parapet and exited the 
fortress to the north running to a nearby road. 
Meanwhile the air strikes continued with mixed 
success. A number of the ordnance missed the 
southern courtyard but Northern Alliance soldiers on 
the spot claimed the air strikes were instrumental in 
containing the Taliban to the southern section of the 
fortress. However, in possession of the weapons 
facilities, the Taliban insurrection was far from over. 
In fact, it was just beginning.
Monday, 25 November
By the next morning the battle lines were firmly 
drawn. Taliban fighters still controlled the southern 
courtyard—roughly half of the approximately 500- 
meter-long fortress—while Northern Alliance troops 
had reinforced their positions at the main gate, along 
the northern walls and just outside the southern walls 
of the fortress. A T-55 main battle tank remained on 
the northeast tower from the day before, while a 
second tank continued to hold its position below in 
the courtyard, barrel pointing into an alleyway 
between the southern and northern courtyards.
Taliban fire from the southern courtyard was 
significant, as they had managed to acquire rockets 
and mortar systems in addition to other small arms. 
However, the lower interior wall dividing the 
northern and southern courtyards severely reduced 
the Taliban forces’ field of fire. Much of the firing 
was directed through the alleyway, since attempts to 
fire over the interior wall sent rocket and rifle fire 
arcing over the external north wall and into nearby 
fields.
At around 11:00 a.m. the U.S. and British 
Special Forces again arrived in an attempt to retrieve 
Spann’s body. A group of 11 personnel proceeded to
the main gate and then broke into two positions 
within the fort designated CAS 1 (Close Air 
Support) above the main gate and CAS 2 at the 
northeast tower. A QRF position (Quick Reaction 
Force) was set up on the road 300-400 meters north 
of the fortress.
Twenty minutes later a 2000 lb. Joint Direct 
Attack Munition, or JDAM, GBU-32 struck the 
north wall, only meters from the northeast tower, 
basically on top of CAS 2. All five U.S. personnel 
were wounded, the most serious with a fractured 
pelvis. It is possible that British SAS and SBS 
troops were also wounded in the incident but it is 
unclear as the British government failed to say so. 
The fact is, the trajectory of the bomb as it hit the 
wall caused the wall to lift up underneath CAS 2, 
throwing them in the air but likely saving the entire 
team from death. Two Northern Alliance soldiers 
inside the T-55 tank on the northeast tower were 
instantly killed when their tank was flipped by the 
blast ripping the turret from the hull. Dozens of 
other Afghans scurried off the wall stumbling into 
nearby cotton fields, many of them bloody and 
covered in dust. Most of the Northern Alliance 
soldiers along the north wall left the fortress fearing 
further air strikes.
The errant bomb strike marked the end of any 
Afghan or U.S. military operations during the 
remaining daylight hours on Monday. However, 
there continued to be a steady stream of mortar and 
rocket fire coming from the southern courtyard. At 
dusk Special Forces and other U.S. personnel 
returned to the fortress to talk to Northern Alliance 
commanders and survey the bomb damage. They 
were also there to discuss the next phase of the 
operation.
That night (Monday), two AC-130 gunships 
pounded the southern courtyard with 40mm and 
105mm rounds. At about 2:30am they hit an ammo 
dump, detonating the entire cache of weapons 
forcing them to leave the airspace above the Qala-i 
Jangi.
Tuesday, 26 November
The mood among Northern Alliance soldiers at
the fortress was optimistic Tuesday morning on the 
heels of the AC-130 strikes. Some Afghan soldiers 
suggested there might be a handfull of Taliban still 
alive and in fighting condition but no more than that.
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U.S. troops from the Iff1' Mountain Light Infantry Division at the QRF position prior to Monday's air strike.
Still preparations were being taken for a final assault 
on the southern courtyard. Northern Alliance 
General Majid Rozi gave instructions to his 
commanders for what he said would be the final 
push to retake the southern courtyard and end the 
insurrection. The attack was scheduled to begin at 10 
am but ran a little late as again U.S. and British 
Special Forces personnel arrived, pulling into the 
main gate. They reestablished their position on the 
roof of the main gate. Aircraft could be heard 
overhead and it appeared that they were prepared to 
call in further strikes if for some reason the battle 
escalated out of control or the Northern Alliance lost 
the upper hand.
Northern Alliance soldiers massed inside the 
main gate and along the north side of the interior 
wall. Additional Northern Alliance troops were 
positioned outside the exterior wall, just south of the 
fortress. Once put into effect, the plan called for 
Northern Alliance troops to storm the Taliban-held 
southern courtyard from both the northern courtyard 
and over the southern exterior wall. A T-55 and 
another T-62 main battle tank were brought into the 
fortress through the main gate to support the push 
into the Taliban-controlled area, while Northern 
Alliance troops surrounded the fortress to keep the 
Taliban from escaping over the exterior wall.
The fighting commenced in fits and starts, and 
dead and wounded (including one Taliban wounded 
by shrapnel, whom Northern Alliance soldiers 
characterized as Tajik) were carried out through the 
main gate or over the southern exterior wall, put into 
commandeered taxis and jeeps and driven away, 
presumably to a hospital.
By noon the Northern Alliance had penetrated 
the southern courtyard through the alleyway and 
controlled the western half of the southern courtyard 
all the way to the pink house, as well as the parapets 
above on the southern wall of the fortress. However, 
the east end of the courtyard, protected by woods 
and various buildings, was not easy to clear and the 
Taliban continued to put up stiff resistance. 
Eventually Northern Alliance troops worked ,their 
way down the wall and began clearing the remaining 
courtyard meter by meter.
Progress was frequently interrupted by soldiers 
stopping to loot the dead and scavenge weapons and 
other valuables off the battlefield much to the anger 
of their commanders.
The troops’ hesitancy to move forward was well 
founded as it seemed that just when the battle 
appeared to be over, Taliban emerged from the 
stables or other buildings, opening fire on the
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Northern Alliance soldiers en route to the fortress, which is visible in the background.
advancing Northern Alliance soldiers. This led to 
the retreat of Northern Alliance back to the parapet 
above and the firefight would begin all over again.
Unwilling to risk more close-quarters combat, the 
Northern Alliance moved in the T-62 tank, and fired 
a series of rounds into suspected Taliban positions in 
the eastern part of the courtyard. By dusk Northern 
Alliance forces had overrun the courtyard. The 
insurrection at Qala-i Jangi was all but over. 
Sometime later, the Special Forces retrieved Spann’s 
body from the southern courtyard with the help of 
Northern Alliance personnel.
The Aftermath and Conclusion
General Dostum, who had been in Konduz 
during the entire uprising arrived back in Mazar-e 
Sharif in the early morning hours on Wednesday. He 
met dozens of journalists who descended on the 
fortress for the first time. Hundreds of bodies lay 
strewn about the fortress: Taliban and Northern 
Alliance.
The next day, Thursday, Northern Alliance 
troops discover Taliban still holed up in the cell 
structure below the pink house. Two days later, 
Saturday, after rocketing, pouring oil, and then 
water, into the cell structure below, 86 Taliban
emerge from below into the courtyard. There are 
two U.S. citizens among them.
The Qala-i Jangi uprising will likely be 
remembered as one of the most brutal moments of 
the war, in part, due to the graphic media coverage 
and the scenes of bodies strewn about the courtyard. 
However, there will also continue to be a number of 
troubling questions regarding the uprising. Was it 
preventable and was it necessary for so many to die 
in the process?
While it has been alleged that the battle was a 
deliberate massacre of the type that has plagued 
Afghanistan for decades, the debacle was more a 
result of a series of mistakes. First, the Taliban 
prisoners were never adequately searched. At least 
one killed himself and a Northern Alliance 
commander by grenade in the desert meeting place 
northeast of Mazar-e Sharif before being taken to 
Qala-i Jangi Fortress on Saturday night. That attack 
should have prompted a thorough search, but none 
was made then, or after the prisoners’ arrival at the 
fort, or on Sunday morning prior to being brought 
out into the courtyard.
Second, when the revolt began the Northern 
Alliance was severely undermanned, by all accounts 
outnumbered by at least 4 to 1. Furthermore, the
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fortress, except for the cell structure below the pink 
house, was never designed as a prison. The Taliban 
were housed less than 20 meters from stockpiled 
weapons—although they were probably unaware of 
this upon entering the fortress.
Third, it seems the prisoners were given no 
adequate guarantees for their safety, and being 
foreigners, may have felt they would surely be killed 
and therefore had nothing to lose. Taliban who 
survived the uprising claim that some in the group 
cried as they were being led into the courtyard 
Sunday morning—certain they were going to be 
killed. Once the uprising began Northern Alliance 
soldiers on the scene seemed to indicate that now, 
since the Taliban had instigated the insurrection, 
they would finish it—there would be no more 
attempts to get the remaining Taliban to surrender.
This reaction to the uprising is similar with what 
General Dostum’s men had to say about the Girl’s 
School massacre in Mazar-e Sharif less than two 
weeks prior. In that event, members of Dostum’s 
forces claim that negotiators were sent into the 
school to discuss the terms of the surrender but were 
killed by the Pakistanis during the negotiation 
process. At which point General Dostum’s forces 
relentlessly attacked the school until all the 600 
Pakistanis inside were killed.
Finally, the CIA operatives in the fortress on 
Sunday did not have adequate backup once the 
uprising began—no quick reaction force outside the 
fortress walls. In addition, they were without vital 
communications equipment and were forced to rely 
on a journalist’s satellite phone to bring in the 
Special Forces. There were also rumors during the 
battle that the initial cause of the uprising may have 
been aggressive reporting. However, since the 
journalists within the fortress on Sunday morning 
were not present in the southern courtyard when the 
revolt began, there has been speculation that this 
reference to journalists may refer to the CIA 
operatives working among the prisoners with their 
digital camera.
Serious questions also remain regarding the 
number of prisoners involved. If, as General 
Dostum’s Political Officer, Olim Razum, claims, up 
to 500 Taliban were in the fortress at the 
insurrection’s beginning, then a significant number 
remain unaccounted for. Pakistanis have resurfaced 
in Pakistan after the incident claiming to have been 
part of the group to taken to the fortress. They claim 
that they escaped during the night and eventually 
made their way out of Afghanistan. Taliban were 
lynched blocks from Qala-i Jangi by local residents
and at least three were found dead outside the 
fortress walls near an open drain pipe.
In the final analysis, the battle of Qala-i Jangi 
provides a window into how the war had been 
conducted up to the more recent Operation 
Anaconda—Taliban versus Northern Alliance, 
supported by Coalition Special Forces and air power. 
It will also be remembered as a bloodbath. However, 
the incident should be considered in light of the 
series of grave errors that led to its tragic conclusion.
Dodge Billingsley is the director of Combat Films 
and Research and was present at the uprising. He 
witnessed the errant U.S. bomb strike and the 
retaking of the southern courtyard by Northern 
Alliance forces.
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